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1. Introduction 
Institutional aspects play a prominent part in labour relations, 
so that theoretical and empirical modelling in this field of 
economics may dif f er from country to country. Against this background 
we look at the specific role of the so called wage space in wage 
negotiations in the Netherlands. The wage space is defined as the 
sumof price inflation and labour productivity growth. Traditionally, 
wage negotiations between employers associations and central 
trade unions in the Netherlands are conducted at central level. 
The wage space indicates the room of manoeuvre for the negotiators 
from a macro-economie point of view. 
This paper investigates to what extent the wage space has been a 
leading determinant in wage formation and to what extent (temporary) 
deviations of wages from the wage space have led to labour conflicts. 
Af ter a short institutional survey, the next section tests for 
co-integration between wages and wage space in order to see 
whether there is a stable long-run relationship between these two 
variables. Section 3 gives an empirical analysis of the contribution 
of labour conflicts to this stable relationship, whereas section 
4 shows how wage space and labour conflicts play a dual role as 
error correction mechanism in the wage formation process. Finally, 
some conclusions are drawn in section 5. 
2. Co-integration of wages and wage space in the Netherlands 
2.1 Institutional survey 
In the post-war period we distinguish four different regimes in 
wage negotiation and wage formation in the Netherlands. The 
first regime lasted from 1945 to 1959. This period is charac-
terized by the so called "strictly guided wage policy", where 
uniform wages were determined at national level. The main aim of 
this wage policy of the government was to have wage increases 
restricted by the growth rate of labour productivity. At the same 
time the government pursued a strict price policy. During this 
regime, a governmental institution had the formal power to invalidate 
wage increases which were inconsistent with the governments 
objectives. 
The second regime, from 1960 to 1969, formed a transitional 
stage. Wage determination alternated between f ree negotiations 
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and government intrusion. The years 1960-1962 were characterized 
by the so called "differentiated wage policy", which allowed for 
variation in the wage increase over industries. Wages in industries 
were negotiated with both the productivity of the industry itself 
and a national trend as starting point. From 1963 to 1969 wages 
were determined freely at industry level -except for 1966 and 
1967. 
The third regime lasted from 1970 to 1982. In this period, wage 
formation in the private sector became, formally spoken, free of 
government intervention. However, the government kept its authority 
to interfere in the wage formation process in second instance, in 
case the outcomes of the "free negotiations" were inconsistent 
with its economie policy objectives. In that case the government 
issued so called national wage pauses. It is important to notice 
that the centralized structure of wage determination remained 
intact. Before the start of the yearly negotiation rounds in the 
industries and/or enterprises, central negotiation rounds took 
place between the central trade unions, the employers associa-
tions and the government. The aim of these meetings was to provide 
guidelines for the negotiations at industry and enterprise level 
with respect to limits for wage increases against the background 
of macroeconomic development. 
The fourth wage formation regime runs from 1983 until now. Af ter 
a central agreement in 1982 the government ended its forraal 
interference in the wage negotiations indeed. However, the government 
still indicates which wage increase would be desirable from a 
macroeconomic policy point of view. This indication has an iramediate 
impact on wage negotiations both at the central and at the industry 
or enterprise level. 
Chart 1. Wage space and wage sum per employee in the Netherlands, 
1950-1988 
% Increase 
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 
Wage space ~'— Wage sum p. employee 
Source CBS (1990) 
This survey shows that, in all four regimes, wage negotiations in 
the Netherlands have consistently been guided by directives on a 
central level. In this interventionist government policy, labour 
productivity has always acted as a main indicator for allowable 
real wage increases in the market sector. The post-war history of 
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wage formation in the Netherlands therefore suggests a stable 
relationship between wages and wage space. The parallel development 
of wages and wage space in chart 1 at first sight confirms this 
suggestion. Yet, chart 1 also shows that the wage increase exceeds 
the wage space in a number of years (especially during the period 
1968-1974) and that at the beginning of the "1980s the wage space 
has not been fully filled up by wage increases. 
2.2 Testing for co-integration 
Prior to the testing of the existence of long-run relationship 
between wages and wage space by co-integration tests, we should 
first determine the order of integration of the relevant macroecono-
mic variables (see e.g. Engle and Granger, 1987, and Henry and 
Hall, 1988). Table 1 gives the results for the unit-root tests on 
the time series over the period 1950-1988 for wages, wage space 
and its component parts: the percentage change of the consumer price 
index and of labour productivity1. Besides we consider the (long 
and short term) unemployment rate in order to account for the 
Phillips-curve effect in the wage formation process. 
Table 1. Unit root test results for relevant series with respect 
to the wage equation for the Netherlands, 1950-1988 
Variable DW DF+c DF 
Wage sum per employee (w) 
Consumer price (p) 
Labour productivity (h) 
Wage space (p+h**ws) 
Unemployment (U) rate (u) 
Short-term U-ratel (us) 
Long-term U-rate2 (ui) 
Aw 
Ap 
Ah 
Aws 
Au 
Aus 
Aul 
0.53 * 
0.75 
1.39 
0.80 
O.OA * 
0.12 * 
0.13 * 
2.30 
2.37 
2.62 
2.56 
0.85 
1.39 
0.76 * 
-2.17 * 
-2.99 
-A.33 
-2.95 
-0.A7 * 
-0.76 * 
+0.03 * 
-7.77 
-7.2A 
-8.2A 
-7.89 
-3.07 
-A.03 
-1.74 * 
-1.12 * 
-1.95 * 
-2.18 
-1.59 * 
-1.56 * 
-0.24 * 
+0.94 * 
-7.82 
-7.26 
-8.36 
-7.93 
-3.04 
-3.94 
-1.89 * 
Critical Values (cr=5%) 0.68 -2.89 -1.95 
° percentage change 
* significant at 5%-level 
1
 unemployment lasting less than 1 year 
2
 unemployment lasting 1 year or longer 
1
 We presume that lags longer than one year are not relevant 
in the context of our paper. Therefore, we have not tested for 
unit roots by means of the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF-)test. 
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Although the null-hypothesis of a unit root of the wage space is 
rejected at the 5%-level in case of the Durbin-Watson (DW-) 
statistic and the Dickey-Fuller (DF-)statistic with a constant 
term, we may as yet conclude from table 1 that the percentage 
change of the wage sum per employee, the wage space and the total 
and short-term rates of unemployment are of integration order 1(1) 
and become stationary after first differencing. It is noticeable 
in this respect that the long-term unemployment variable shows no 
stationarity in its first difference and thus, according to this 
test, appear not to be co-integrated. 
The following step is the estimation of the co-integration 
regression. In case two variables, x and y, are co-integrated the 
residuals of the estimated regression between x and y must be 
stationary, i.e. of integration order 1(0). For this purpose, the 
same tests as for stationarity are used, only with a different 
null-hypothesis: the hypothesis reads now that the residuals do 
not have an unit root. So, when the values of the DW-statistic 
(commonly called: the CRDW-statistic) and the DF-statistic exceed 
their critical values, co-integration between the variables may 
exist. In order to test for co-integration we regressed various 
combinations of wage, wage space and the unemployment rates over 
the sample period, 1950-1988. 
Table 2. unit root test results for co-integration regressions 
in the Netherlands, 1950-1988 
Co-integration regression R2 CRDW DF 
o 
(a) w m 1.03ws 0.73 1.41 -4.42 
0 (24.8) 
(b) w - 0.95 + 0.91ws 0.73 1.22 -4.72 
.. (1-1) (9.1) 
(c) w « 3.87 + 0.76ws - 0.30ut j 0.82 1.39 -4.38 
0 (4.0) (8.6) (4.4) 
(d) w - 3.98 + 0.76ws - 0.55ust.1 0.84 1.56 -4.78 
(4.4) (9.6) (5.0) 
It follows from table 2 that the co-integration regression Durbin-
Watson- (CRDW) and the Dickey-Fuller- (DF) statistics exceed 
their critical values (which are 0.67 and -1.95 respectively), so 
that the null-hypothesis of no co-integration is rejected for 
each equation considered. Therefore, the co-integration regressions 
give statistical support for the existence of a long-run unity value 
between wages and the wage space in the Netherlands. Moreover, 
the results for the (short-run)unemployment term show that the 
long-run relationship includes a Phillips-curve effect. 
For that reason we should reckon with this Phillips-curve effect 
in the estimation of our wage equation. This paper, however, 
seeks to give an economie interpretation to the error correction 
mechanism ("who is correcting the error?") and does not -as most 
empirical studies on co-integration and error correction do-
consider the error correction mechanism as a mere mechanical 
device to obtain a neat statistical specification of the wage 
equation with nice long-run properties. Therefore, we do not 
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follow Engle and Granger's (1987) two step procedure by first 
estimating the full long-run relationship and then including 
deviatlons from that long-run relationship as a error correction 
in the short run equation. Instead, we first estimate the short-
run relation with separate error correction terms for the wage 
space and the Phillips-curve effect and compute the long-run 
relationship from our estimates of the short-run equation afterwards 
(see e.g. Davidson et al. 1978, for this procedure). Moreover, an 
analysis of the co-integration regression over two sub-periods 
shows that the long-run effect of the wage space is quite stable-
as our historical survey suggested- but the long-run Phillips-
curve effect is not. This provides another reason for separating 
the long-run effects of the wage space and the Phillips-curve in 
the wage equation. 
2.3 Wages and wage space in other industrialized countries. 
As mentioned before, the dominance of the wage space in the wage 
negotiations in the Netherlands has a strong institutional 
background. It is, however, presumable that, in spite of a different 
institutional setting, such long-run relationship between wages 
and wage space exists in other industrialized countries as well. 
In order to investigate this, we have tested for co-integration 
of wages and wage space in West Germany, the United Kingdom and 
the United States. The results of the integration tests are given 
in table 3. 
Table 3. Unit root tests for three other industrialized 
countries, 1954-1985 
Variable DW DF+c DF 
West Germany 
Wage Sum per Employee 
Wage Space 
United Kingdom 
Wage Sum per Employee 
Wage Space 
United States (1956-1985) 
Wage Sum per Employee 
Wage Space 
0.56 * 
1.68 
0.74 
1.29 
0.25 * 
2.34 
-2.90 
-4.70 
-2.65 * 
-3.77 
-1.14 * 
-6.46 
-0.80 * 
-3.37 
-1.12 * 
-1.81 * 
-0.63 * 
-3.05 
Critical Values (a=5Z) 0.70 -2.89 -1.95 
* significant at 5%-level 
From table 3 it appears that both in West Germany and in the United 
States wages and wage space are not of the same order of integration. 
Hence in these two countries co-integration between wages and 
wage space and a long-run stable relationship between these two 
variables apparently does not exist. Like the Netherlands, in the 
United Kingdom the post-war time series for wages and wage space 
are both of the integration order 1(1). Moreover, when running 
the co-integration regression for the United Kingdom, 
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w = 5.13 + 0.55ws (2a) 
(3.5) (4.0) 
DF= -3.68, CRDW = 1.26, 
we see that both the CRDW-statistic and the' DF-statistic of the 
estimated equation are above the critical values. Thus, our tests 
show that, although the stability of the long-run relationship 
between wages and wage space is rooted in the institutional 
setting of the wage negotiations in the Netherlands, it is not a 
typical and unique Dutch phenomenon. 
It is, however noticeable that the coëfficiënt value of the wage 
space variable in the co-integration regression (table 2, l.b) for 
the Netherlands does not significantly differ from unity, whereas 
this coëfficiënt obtains a value of 0.55 only in the United 
Kingdom co-integration regression (2a). However, Hall and Henry's 
study (1988), using more explanatory variables, give reasons to 
believe that the estimated coëfficiënt for the wage space is 
close to unity. When we run a co-integration regression omitting 
the constant term, 
w - 0.95 ws (2b) 
DF« -4.29, CRDW » 2.65, 
we also find that the coëfficiënt for the wage space is close to 
unity, and that wages and wage space are co-integrated. 
3. Labour conflicts and the wage space 
The dominant role of the wage space in Dutch wage negotiations 
puts the question whether wage offers by the employers associations 
which are f ar below the wage space, or whether wage demands by 
the trade unions which are f ar above the wage space, leads to 
tension in the negotiation process and hence to labour conflicts. 
If this were so, the threat of labour conflicts would, in a way, 
act as stabilizing device in the long-run relationship between 
wages and wage space. 
Strike activity may be regarded as an empirical measure of labour 
conflicts. We have, therefore, tested the hypothesis above by a 
regression equation with strike activity, measured as the logarithm 
of the number of working days lost in strikes (logstd), as the 
dependent variable, and the difference of the wage increase and 
the wage space as the independent variable. The latter variable 
is labelled the wage gap, and is defined as the difference between 
wages and the wage space: 
o o o o 
wg - w - ws « w - p - h 
The estimation result of the regression is given in the first 
line of table 4. We have specified the wage gap variable with a 
one year lag and found a significant coëfficiënt value with the 
expected negative sign. This equation predicts much strike activity 
in the next year, when this year's negotiations have resulted in 
wage increases which are below the wage space. On the other hand, 
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there will be little strike activity in the next year when a high 
wage increase as compared to the wage space is obtained2. 
Table 4. Determinants of labour conflicts in the Netherlands, 
1950-1988 
logs td = « 0 + a i w S - i + 
0 
a 2 aiq_ 1 + 
o 
a3Aaiq_ x R2 DW 
(a ) = 10.7 
(50.7) 
-0 .23 
(2 .2) 
0.14 1.87 
(b) = 10.7 
(51.6) 
-0 .28 
(3.3) 
0.22 1.65 
( c ) 10.6 
(55.8) 
-0 .25 
(4 .5) 
0.36 1.51 
t-values in parentheses 
logstd: the logarithm of the number of working days lost in strikes 
aiq : percentage change of the labour income ratio 
Theoretically, a change in the wage gap is equal to a change in 
the macroeconomic labour income ratio (alq). However, in empirical 
analysis substantial differences occur between the data on the 
change in wage gap and labour income ratio, due to differences in 
measurement and in definition. The main difference regards the 
definition of prices: consumer price index in the wage gap and 
price index of demand in the labour income ratio. Moreover our 
definition of the labour income ratio is corrected for capital-
intensive industries (e.g. the production of natural gas). The 
estimation result for equation (b) of table 4 shows that the 
change in the labour income ratio as a determinant of strike 
activity yields a somewhat better fit than the wage gap. Equation 
(c) of table 4 indicates that strike activity is still better 
explained by the acceleration or deceleration of the labour 
income ratio (Aaiq). 
The theory implied in equations (b) and (c) of table 4 differs 
somewhat from that of equation (a). In modern theoretical microecono-
mic bargaining models incomplete and asymmetrie information on 
the firms (expected) profitability constitutes an important 
determinant for the occurrence of strikes (see e.g. Card, 1988; 
Tracy, 1986; Farber, 1978). At the macro level the (change in 
the) labour income ratio can be regarded as a measure of profita-
bility. Hence, equation (b) can be interpreted as a test for this 
micro theory on a macro level (see Den Butter, 1989). When in one 
year profitability increases, there will be much strike activity 
in the next year. 
On the other hand, equation (c) may represent the post-Keynesian 
"target real wage theory" (see Van Hulst, 1984), which predicts 
that trade unions want to achieve a target variable (the real 
wage) over a certain period of time. It may be plausible to 
2
 Lagging the wage gap longer than; one year, or a combina-
tion of weighted averages, did not yield a more significant ex-
planation for the occurrence of strikes-, than did a one year lag. 
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assume that the trade unions in the Netherlands envisaged a rise 
in the share of labour in national income, as the actual level of 
the labour income ratio has increased steadily in the period 
1960-1982. Hence, a deceleration of this ratio would have increased 
strike activity. However, after 1982 the target real wage theory 
would only hold, if we assume that the trade unions have set a 
new, lower target in that year, as the labour income ratio has 
decreased since 1982. 
A possible interpretation for the one year lag of the explana-
tory variables in the equations of table 4 is that these variables 
represent (static) expectations. A less sophisticated but more 
obvious explanation for this one year lag is, however, that wage 
negotiations and hence strike activity in the Netherlands takes 
place in the beginning of the year. On that moment, only macroecono-
mic data on the previous year are available to the negotiators3. 
4. Wage formation and the wage space 
Recently a number of empirical studies on the wage equation in 
the Netherlands has been published (e.g. by Graafland and Huizinga, 
1988, and Mulder, 1990) which use the co-integration approach. 
Although these studies estimate the components of the wage space 
separately in the co-integration regression, they do not reject 
an unity value for a long term relationship between wages and the 
wage space. Using a simple specification of the wage equation 
from these studies as starting point4, we empirically investigate 
the role of labour conflicts and the wage space in wage formation 
in the Netherlands. Our wage equation is specified as follows: 
o 
Aw •= /30 + /3xAws + P2An_1 + / 3 3 l o g s t d . x + /3*wg_ j 
+ / 3 4 u . 2 + / 3 * u s . 2 ( 3 ) 
We expect the following signs of the coefficients: 
P1 and p3 > 0; /32 , j3* and /3< (0*) < 0, 
the asterisks denoting alternative specification possibilities. 
Equation (a) of table 5 gives the estimation results for the 
dynamic regression without a long-run effect. In equation (b) of 
table 5, actual strike activity is taken as explanatory variable 
in addition to the wage space. Although the coëfficiënt value of 
3
 We also ran the regressions with the projected data of the 
Central Planning Bureau (CPB) on price inflation and labour 
productivity, but obtained worse results than with the actual 
data with a one year lag. It is remarkable in this respect that 
the Director of the CPB has recently refused to publish macroeconomic 
forecasts which are to be used for linking social benefits to 
wages in the private sector. (NRC-Handelsblad, February 19, 1990) 
* We left out the influence of employers- and employees 
taxes, vacancies and did not try other functional forms for the 
Phillips-curve effect. 
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strike activity obtains the expected positive sign in this equation, 
it does not differ significantly from zero. In equation (b') the 
unemployment rate representing the long-run Phillips-curve effect 
is added to the previous specification. lts coëfficiënt value does 
not have the expected negative sign nor does it dif fer significantly 
from zero. 
Table 5. Estimation results for the vage equation in the Netherlands, 
1950-1988 
0 
Aw = /3jAws + PzAu_1+ /33 logstd_ 1+ Ptvê.x* J3<u_2 +/3*us_2 R2 DW 
(a ) 0 .59 
( 6 . 3 ) 
- 0 . 7 4 
( 2 . 7 ) 
0 .54 2 . 2 8 
(b) 0 . 61 
( 6 . 3 ) 
- 0 . 7 2 
( 2 . 6 ) 
0 .20 
( 0 . 8 ) 
0 .54 2 .34 
(b«) 0 .61 
( 6 . 2 ) 
- 0 . 7 3 
( 2 . 6 ) 
0 .18 
( 0 . 7 ) 
0 .04 
( 0 . 6 ) 
0 .53 2 .36 
( c ) 0 .70 
( 9 . 9 ) 
- 0 . 8 9 
( 4 . 5 ) 
- 0 . 7 4 - 0 . 1 2 
( 5 . 8 ) ( 2 . 0 ) 
0 .77 - 0 . 2 3 * 
( C ) 0 .70 - 0 . 7 7 - 0 . 8 0 -0 .27 0 .78 - 0 . 0 3 * 
( 1 0 . 3 ) ( 3 . 8 ) ( 6 . 0 } (2 5) 
( c " ) 0 . 7 3 - 0 . 5 0 - 0 . 5 9 a i q . j -0 .15 0 .70 2 .12 
( 8 . 9 ) ( 2 . 1 ) ( 4 . 4 ) (1 .2) 
the constant term (/30) is left out to save space 
t-values in parentheses 
Durbin's H-statistic (as the lagged depended variable is taken as 
explanatory variable) 
When we take the wage gap instead of actual strike activity as 
the additional explanatory variable (and hence substitute equation 
(a) of table 4, in wage equation (b') in table 5), we obtain 
much better estimation results. This is shown in equation (c) of 
table 5. In equation (c) the wage gap is correctly specified as 
error correction term, since we have tested that wages and wage 
space are co-integrated. The definition of the wage gap iroplicitly 
assumes a unit value for the long run relationship between wages 
and the wage space. Therefore equation (c) neatly describes the 
error correction mechanism in the wage negotiation process and 
gives an economie interpretation for it: too large deviations of 
the wages from the wage space are "corrected" by the threat of 
labour conflicts. It is our inference from these estimation 
results that not so much labour conflicts themselves but mainly 
the threat of these conflicts is responsible for the error 
correction. We think so because of the much better fit of equation 
(c) as compared to that of equation (b'). We appreciate, however, 
that such conclusions may be too far reaching to be drawn form 
simple regression results based on macro time series data. Further 
research on the demands and offers of the negotiating parties, 
and their willingness to make concessions during the bargain, may 
provide better insight into the validity of this argument. 
From the empirical studies mentioned at the beginning of this 
section it appears that, especially in the recent past, short 
term unemployment is a better representative for the long-run 
Phillips-curve effect than total unemployment. Equation (c') 
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shows that the influence of the short-term unemployed on the wage 
rate is somewhat larger than that of total unemployment according 
to our estimates as well. Yet, this alternative measure of the 
Phillips-curve effect does not improve our specification very much. 
Finally, equation (c'') of table 5 gives the'results for the wage 
equation with the change in the labour income ratio as explanatory 
variable, instead of the wage gap. Whereas the labour income 
ratio yields a better fit as compared to the wage gap in equation 
(b) of table 3 for strike activity, it apparently does not do so 
in the wage equation. This result corroborates our conclusion 
that in the wage negotiations the wage space and hence the wage 
gap plays a prominent role, while for explaining actual strike 
activity macroeconomic profitability is the main determinant. 
Therefore, we would select equation (c) of table 5 with the error 
correction term wg_
 ï and the one year lagged level of unemployment 
as a proper description of wage formation in the Netherlands. The 
long term solution of this equation is, 
o 
w = -1.A6 - 0.16u_j + ws 
In order to investigate the stability of our preferred equation 
we have split the sample period into two sub-periods in conformity 
with the institutional survey of section 2.1. The results of 
table 6 show that this regression equation is quite stable, 
apart from the long-run Phillips-curve effect. It is in conformity 
with the outcome of the afore-mentioned stability analysis of the 
co-integration regression. 
Table 6. Dynamic vage equation for the Hetherlands over two sub-
samples 
Sample period 
O 
Aw 
- Pi Aws + /32 Au. 1 + /33wS-i + P^-2 R2 H* 
1952- 1962 0 70 -1 .22 -0 73 -0 59 0.93 -0.5A 
(7 6) (2 .5) (2 .3) (1 0) 
1963- 1988 0 77 -1 .OA -0 .89 -0 16 0.61 -0.29 
(6 1) (3 • 7) (A • 2) (2 3) 
the constant term (/30) is left out to save space 
t-values in parentheses 
* Durbin's H-statistic 
Finally, we regressed the wage equation including both the strike 
variable and the wage gap in order to test whether our hypothesis 
of substitution of both variables is valid over the two sub-periods. 
As appears from table 7, strikes had a significant positive 
effect on wages before 1963, while since that year their influence 
reduced markedly. An explanation for this stronger influence in 
the forraer period may be that the trade unions did not adopt the 
strike weapon themselves before the 1960s, but strikes that occurred 
were wildcat strikes representing the dissatisfaction of employees 
and of trade union members with the unions' moderated wage policy. 
In case the wage space was not filled up completely, the credibility 
of the trade unions' threat with strikes was, therefore, rather 
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Table 7. Dynamic vage equation for the Netherlands including strikes 
Sample period Aw 
- P, Aws + /32Au. 1 + /33logstd_ i+ P« U-2 + 05 «8-1 R2 H* 
1952- 1962 0 75 -1 15 0 66 -0 34 -0 57 0.93 -1.22 
(9 5) (2 • 9 ) (2 0) (0 7) (2 .1) 
1963- 1988 0 77 -1 ,05 0 13 -0 17 -0 .91 0.60 -0.44 
(6 1) (3 • 7) (0 6) (2 4) (4 .2) 
the constant term (/30) is left out to save space 
t-values in parentheses 
* Durbin's H-statistic 
low in that period. The sharp rise in the estimated coëfficiënt 
value of the wage gap and the parallel decline of the coëfficiënt 
value of the strike variable, combined with the notion that the 
trade unions indeed adopted strikes as a threat in the latter 
period, may confirm our hypothesis that the threat of strikes 
rather than actual strike activity acted as error correction 
mechanism. 
5. Conclusions 
This paper illustrates the central role of the concept of wage 
space in wage negotiations and wage formation in the Netherlands. 
It is shown that, unlike in some other industrialized countries, 
wages and wage space are co-integrated in the Netherlands and 
therefore, that a stable relationship between these two variables 
exists. When, given the situation on the labour market presented 
by the Phillips-curve, wage increases were substantially below or 
above the wage space for some time, this will be corrected in the 
outcome of the next wage negotiations. In most negotiation rounds 
in the Netherlands there has been a general consensus, or even a 
central agreement, on the desired increase of wages as related to 
the wage space. Strikes have been used in the negotiations mainly 
as a threat and not as an actual weapon, markedly after 1963. 
Actual strike activity, which is low in the Netherlands as compared 
to its neighbouring countries (with the exception of West Germany: 
see Walsh, 1983), is mainly associated with the desire of the 
trade unions to obtain a (larger) share of the prof its in the 
industry. Therefore, we presume that the co-integration of wages 
and wage space, which is typical for the Netherlands, has much 
more to do with the political consensus that the wage space 
provides the room for wage increases, than with actual labour 
conflicts as an error correction mechanism. This conclusion also 
underlines the importance of institutional aspects in labour 
relations. There is no universal theory which can be applied to 
all countries of the world. 
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List of Svmbols 
o 
aiq «• percentage change of the labour income ratio 
o 
h - percentage change of labour productivity 
logstd = the logarithm of number of working days lost in 
strikes 
o 
p = percentage change of the consumer price index 
u = unemployment as a percentage of the total labour force 
ui = long term unemployment (al year) as a percentage of 
the total labour force 
us = short term unemployment (<1 year) as a percentage of 
the total labour force 
o 
w = percentage change of the wage sum per employee 
wg = wage gap 
ws = wage space 
Sutmnarv 
The wage space, i.e. the sum of price inflation and labour 
productivity growth, has played a major role as indicator of 
allowable wage increases in the post-war wage negotiations in the 
Netherlands. This paper shows that: (a) wage and wage space are 
co-integrated eventually added by an unemployment term; (b) the 
deviation of wages and the wage space acts as an error correction 
term in the wage equation; and (c) the threat of labour conflicts 
rather than actual strike activity may be identified as "mechanism" 
behind this error correction in the wage equation. 
